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EMOTE CONTROL*: THE SUBSTITUTION OF SYMBOL FOR
SUBSTANCE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
JULES LOBEL** AND GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN***
Man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times
this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circum-
stances; but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it
to the power of a collective psychosis.
Albert Einstein in undated letter to Sigmund Freud
INTRODUCTION
In an essay titled Economic Imperialism, the economist Edward
Lazear trumpets the many triumphs of the economics profession, including
the influence of economic reasoning on other disciplines. Among these,
law may well be the most prominent.' By "economic reasoning," Lazear
elaborates that "the individual or the firm is maximizing something, usually
utility or profit.' 2 It is precisely this rationalistic cost-benefit aspect of eco-
nomics that makes it so appealing to many legal thinkers. Law, too, prides
itself on decision making based on reason and is premised on the assump-
tion that benefits arise from a deliberative process.
Ironically, however, just as law seems on the verge of embracing its
imperialistic conquerors, economics itself is starting to change in response
to influences coming from without. Behavioral economics-the application
of insights from psychology to economics-has established a solid footing
within the larger discipline and is already exerting an influence on many of
the disciplines to which the standard economic paradigm had only recently
begun to be applied. 3 Law is no exception, with diverse work now being
done in what has come to be called "behavioral law and economics."
* We thank Rosa Loewenstein for (accidentally) suggesting this title when she requested the
means for replaying a scene from Cinderella. More substantively, we thank Sophie Freud, Sam Issa-
charoff, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments, and Cathy Potter for help in editing and researching
the manuscript.
University of Pittsburgh Law School.
* Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University.
1. Edward P. Lazear, Economic Imperialism, 115 Q.J. ECON. 99 (2000).
2. Id. at 100.
3. For a discussion of the broad reach of economic ideas, see Lazear's Economic Imperialism,
supra note 1.
1045
CHICAGO- KENT LA W REVIEW
Much of behavioral economics leaves untouched the rationality that
makes economics so appealing to legal scholars. The main thrust of behav-
ioral economists has been to relax some of the patently unrealistic assump-
tions that economists make about human preferences-e.g., that people are
selfish, that they care about outcomes exactly in proportion to their likeli-
hood of occurring, or that they discount the future exponentially at a con-
stant rate.4 Arguably, one can relax any of these assumptions without
abandoning the core idea that people maximize utility.
More recent developments, however, pose a more fundamental chal-
lenge to the foundational assumptions of economics. In contrast to the con-
ventional approach in economics, which assumes that behavior is chosen to
achieve well-defined goals, the new work suggests that human behavior is
the product of at least two neural systems that operate according to differ-
ent principles and often clash with one another.
In almost all of the new "dual system" perspectives that have been
proposed by economists, one of the systems is well-approximated by the
standard account of economic behavior. This is no coincidence; humans do,
indeed, have the capacity to deliberate about the consequences of their
behavior in a rational fashion, and these deliberations often influence, and
sometimes even exert control over, behavior. We refer to this system as the
"deliberative" system and to its influence on behavior as deliberative con-
trol over behavior.
Although there is less agreement about the exact nature of the other
system, most dual process models are in agreement that, in contrast to the
first system, which is reflective, the second is more reflexive5 and is gener-
ally oriented toward basic, short-term ends-e.g., fight, flight, eating, and
sex-rather than toward the systematic fulfillment of long-term goals. We
refer to this second system as the affective or emotional system, and to its
influence over behavior as "emote control" of behavior.
Although standard economics, as well as the economic approach to
law, assumes that deliberative control of behavior is the norm (and, indeed,
does not generally take account of affective influences), we will argue that
emote control of behavior is the default. It is the default in part because, as
we discuss, deliberation is comparatively slow and laborious process that
has only limited influence over behavior.
4. For a discussion of the implications for law of relaxing many of these assumptions, see Chris-
tine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STANFORD L. REV. 1471 (1998).
5. Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflective and Reflexive Judgment Processes: A Social Cognitive
Neuroscienee Approach, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 44-67 (J.P. Forgas
et al- eds., 2003), available at http://www.scn.ucla.eduipdfiSydneyDM.pdf.
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The purpose of this Article is to outline the basic elements of one par-
ticular dual system perspective and to trace out some of its implications.
After discussing how emote control and deliberative control differ, and
how they interact to determine behavior, we apply our theoretical frame-
work to legal issues involving foreign policy, terrorism, and international
law. We argue that in all of these areas the powerful influence of affect not
only on the general public, but on politicians and judicial decision makers
in particular, leads to a common pattem-a substitution of symbol for
substance.
The substitution of symbol for substance occurs at two levels. First, it
can be seen in the types of situations and stimuli that drive people to ac-
tion-namely vivid symbols rather than rational arguments. Second, it can
be seen in the types of actions that people take-specifically symbolic ac-
tions that are superficially satisfying as opposed to more substantive ac-
tions that are less immediately satisfying but actually more likely to
produce desired long-term results.
I. DELIBERATIVE AND EMOTE CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR
The idea that people do not always make decisions with an eye to con-
sequences, though heretical for economists, is commonplace in psychol-
ogy. 6 While acknowledging that deliberation is one important process that
guides human behavior, philosophers, psychologists, and most recently
psychologically minded economists have proposed a variety of dual proc-
ess perspectives that view human behavior as the joint product of two
qualitatively different processes. 7 The dual process account that we discuss
6. Indeed, there is a long history of psychologists explicitly rejecting the consequentialist per-
spective of economics. See Shira B. Lewin, Economics and Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day
from the Early Twentieth Century, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1293-1323 (1996) for a review. Lewin
notes that William James, for example, attacked adherents of hedonism, noting that they .'obey a
curiously narrow teleological superstition,' for they assume without foundation that behavior always
aims at the goal of maximum pleasure and minimum pain; but behavior is often impulsive, not goal-
oriented." Id. at 1299 (quoting 2 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 551 (1899)).
7. Many different dual-process models have been proposed with different labels: rule-based and
associative, Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3 (1996); rational and experiential systems, Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory and Subjective Probability: Further Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems, 63
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 534 (1992); reflective and reflexive, Matthew D. Lieberman et al.,
Reflexion and Reflection: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Attributional Inference, in 34
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199 (2002); deliberative and implementive sys-
tems, Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., Planning and the Implementation of Goals, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-
REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 211-28 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D.
Vohs eds., 2004); assessment and locomotion, Arie Kruglanski et al., To "Do the Right Thing" or to
"Just Do It": Locomotion and Assessment as Distinct Self-Regulatory Imperatives, 79 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 793 (2000); and type I and type II processes, Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick,
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here draws a distinction between deliberation and affective, or emote con-
trol, of behavior. 8
Our conception of affect is adopted from psychologists with an inter-
est in the evolutionary bases of behavior.9 These psychologists view af-
fects, such as anger, sadness, and fear, as "programs" that evolved to
coordinate the various specialized neural systems of the human brain to
solve important recurrent problems that we encountered in our evolutionary
past. As Cosmides and Tooby describe it, "[w]hen a condition or situation
of an evolutionarily recognizable kind is detected, a signal is sent out from
the emotion program that activates the specific constellation of subpro-
grams appropriate to solving the types of adaptive problems that were regu-
larly embedded in that situation."10 An emotion, in this view, is not
reducible to any one category of effects, such as those involving motivation
or feeling states. Rather, it is a:
superordinate program whose function is to direct the activities and in-
teractions of the subprograms governing perception; attention; inference;
learning; memory; goal choice; ... physiological reactions (e.g., heart
rate, endocrine function, immune function, gamete release); ... motor
systems; ... energy level and effort allocation.., and so on.11
The emotion of fear, for example, produces a wide range of cognitive, per-
ceptual, and motivational effects, including shifts in perception and atten-
tion, changes in goals, physiological effects, and effects on memory.12
Because many of these affective responses evolved before humans existed
as such, we share many of our affects with other animals, although their
manifestation in humans may differ from that in other species.'
3
Perhaps uniquely among animals, however, humans have an addi-
tional capability-a qualitatively different process that guides human be-
havior. This is our ability to deliberate about the long-term consequences of
our behavior. Whereas affective motivation tends to be lexicographic-
driven by single, simple considerations-deliberative decision making is
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
8. The'specific theoretical perspective described here draws heavily on George Loewenstein &
Ted O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Influences on Economic Behavior (Carne-
gie Mellon Univ., Working Paper, Apr. 29, 2004), available at http.//sds.hss.cmu.edu/fac-
ultyfLoewenstein/downloads/animalspirits.pdf.
9. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS 91 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000).
10. Id. at 92.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Id. at 94-95.
13. Id. at 94-97.
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much more compensatory, resulting in a more balanced weighing of costs
and benefits.
This capacity seems to be closely connected to a region of the human
brain called the prefrontal cortex. As Jonathan Cohen writes:
the very fact that economic theory, contrived by the human mind, can
describe optimal behavior provides primafacie evidence that human be-
ings can conceive of optimal behavior, and therefore in principle may be
capable of it. There is good reason to believe that this capability is
closely related to the function of a particular brain structure: the prefron-
tal cortex (PFC). The PFC occupies one third of the neocortex, is one of
the brain areas that has expanded most in humans relative to other pri-
mate species, and overwhelming neuroscientific evidence indicates that
our higher cognitive faculties, including deliberative thought, abstract
reasoning, problem solving, planning, social interaction and language all
rely heavily on the functions of PFC. That is, the PFC may be a critical
substrate for "homo economicus.
' '14
The prefrontal cortex with its rational capabilities did not, however,
replace the older brain systems but was almost literally added on top of
them. As Massey comments:
Emotionality clearly preceded rationality in evolutionary sequence, and
as rationality developed it did not replace emotionality as a basis for hu-
man interaction. Rather, rational abilities were gradually added to preex-
isting and simultaneously developing emotional capacities. Indeed, the
neural anatomy essential for full rationality-the prefrontal cortex-is a
very recent evolutionary innovation, emerging only in the last 150,000
years of a 6-million-year existence, representing only about 2.5 percent
of humanity's total time on earth. 15
Human behavior, therefore, including behavior that is relevant to law,
is not under the sole control of either affect or deliberation but results from
the interaction of these two qualitatively different processes-like a com-
puter that has two different types of processors it can draw upon that proc-
ess information in qualitatively different ways. Emote control is fast but is
largely limited to operating according to evolved patterns. Deliberation is
far more flexible-it can be applied to almost any type of task or problem
one might encounter-but is comparatively slow and laborious. Delibera-
tion involves what psychologists call "controlled processes" that involve
14. Jonathan Cohen, The Vulcanization of the Human Brain: A Neural Perspective on Interactions
Between Cognition and Emotion and Optimality in Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSPS. (forthcoming)
(citation omitted).
15. Douglas S. Massey, A Brief History of Human Society: The Origin and Role of Emotion in
SocialLife, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 15 (2002).
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step-by-step logic or computations and are often associated with a subjec-
tive feeling of effort.16
Emote control is the default mode, while deliberation is invoked in
special circumstances. Deliberation occurs, for example, when a decision
maker encounters a new situation that cannot be solved effectively through
evolved or learned responses. Deliberation can also be evoked either by
directive-e.g., by telling someone that they will be accountable for, or
have to justify, their behavior' 7-or by the demand characteristics of a task.
For example, several studies have found that people tend to evaluate deci-
sion options more affectively when they judge those options one at a time
and more deliberatively when they make explicit choices between op-
tions. 18 Finally, deliberation can be invoked by affect-as first noted in a
seminal article by Herbert Simon. 19 Moderate levels of fear, anger, or al-
most any form of negative affect serve as a warning to the deliberative
system that something is wrong and that its capabilities are required.
Somewhat perversely, however, as affect intensifies, it tends to assume
control over behavior even as it triggers the deliberative system, so one
may realize what the best course of action is, but find one's self behaving
in a quite different fashion. As Kris Kirby eloquently expressed it, "[t]he
trouble with self-control strategies is that we are least motivated to use
16. Walter Schneider & Richard M. Schiffrin, Controlled and Automatic Human Information
Processing: L Detection, Search and Attention, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. I (1977).
17. Jennifer S. Lemer & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999).
18. See Kathleen M. O'Connor et al., What We Want to Do Versus What We Think We Should Do,
15 J. BEHAvIORAL DECISION MAKING 403 (2002). As an example, Kahneman and Ritov asked people in
one condition to evaluate the badness of two problems, one involving dying dolphins and the other involv-
ing farm workers with cancer. Some people were asked to evaluate the problems individually; they evalu-
ated one or the other. Others evaluated the two problems simultaneously. Those asked to evaluate the
problems one at a time rated the dolphin problems as worse, but when they evaluated them comparatively,
most people rated the problem involving skin cancer in humans as worse. Dolphins, it seems, move people
more at an emotional level, but at a more cognitive level, people know that they should care more about
humans. See Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public
Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994). For an application to law,
see David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity
Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1139 (2000). A similar result was found by Bazerman, White, and Loewen-
stein. They had people evaluate different outcomes of a negotiation to resolve a dispute over how to split
some money. When people evaluated the outcomes one at a time, 90% rated a settlement that gave both
parties $500 as more desirable than one that gave themselves $600 and the other party $700. However,
when they evaluated the two potential settlements side-by-side, 80% expressed a preference for the
$600/$700 settlement that gave them more but was inequitable. One possible interpretation of this pattern
is that people have a negative affective response to the inequality, but when forced to make a direct tradeoff
between a settlement that is more lucrative and one that is more equitable, their deliberative side opts for
the former. See Max H. Bazerman, George Loewenstein, & Sally Blount White, Reversals of Preference in
Allocation Decisions: Judging an Alternative Versus Choosing Among Alternatives, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 220
(1992).




them precisely at the times when we most need them."'20 Although affect
serves diverse essential functions, the same affective states that at low or
moderate levels help people to survive can at higher levels produce subop-
timal patterns of behavior. Extreme fear produces panic and immobilization
rather than effective escape. 21 Uncontrolled anger toward another person
can lead to behaviors, such as crimes of passion, that often end up doing
the most damage to one's self.
Not only is emote control the default mode, but even when the condi-
tions are otherwise ripe for deliberation, deliberative control of behavior
can be undermined by a variety of factors. First, because deliberation in-
volves an exertion of mental effort, any factor, such as stress or exhaustion,
that produces mental depletion will lead to a reduction of deliberation and a
commensurate increase in emote control.22 Thus, in one recent study, sub-
jects who were classified as either a morning person or an evening person
conducted a bargaining exercise with another person who was similarly
classified.23 For half the pairs, the exercise took place during a time of day
that was close to the optimum for their circadian rhythm (e.g., in the morn-
ing for morning people); for the other half, it happened at a time when sub-
jects could expect to be emotionally depleted and low in energy. The
effects were dramatic. Almost all pairs who participated at their circadian
peak achieved high joint gains from the exercise, but in almost all pairs
who were off of their circadian optimum, bargaining broke down quickly,
resulting in minimal gains for the subjects.
Second, because deliberation draws on scarce controlled processing,
any factor that taxes the neural units responsible for deliberation will tend
to undermine deliberation and encourage emote control of judgment and
behavior. This point has been illustrated in numerous studies that examine
the implications of "cognitive load" on subjects. In one classic study, for
example, Shiv and Fedorkhin instructed subjects to keep either a 2-digit
(low load) or 7-digit (high load) number in mind as they walked to a differ-
20. Kris N. Kirby & Barbarose Guastello, Making Choices in Anticipation of Similar Future
Choices Can Increase Self-Control, 7 J. ExP. PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 154, 154 (2001).
21. Irving L. Janis, Effects of Fear Arousal on Attitude Change: Recent Developments in Theory
and Experimental Research, in 3 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 166 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1967); Irving L. Janis & Howard Leventhal, Human Reactions to Stress, in HANDBOOK
OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND RESEARCH (Edgar F. Borgatta & William W. Lambert eds., 1968).
22. For a very wide-ranging discussion of research and theory on this point, see ROY
BAUMEISTER, TODD HEATHERTON & DIANNE TICE, LOSING CONTROL: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT
SELF-REGULATION (1994).
23. Roxana M. Gonzalez & George Loewenstein, Effects of Circadian Rhythm on Cooperation in
an Experimental Game (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Working Paper) (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=485442.
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ent room to continue the experiment. 24 On their way they encountered a
table at which they were offered the choice between a serving of fruit salad
or a piece of cake. Based on the idea that many subjects would be on diets,
and that exerting self-control over behavior requires scarce cognitive re-
sources, the authors predicted and found that subjects who were holding the
long number in memory would be more likely to opt for the cake (63%) as
compared with subjects who were holding the short number in memory
(41%).25
Third, because deliberation is slow, deliberative processing takes time.
Hence, any factor that imposes time pressure on a judgment or decision
will tend to undermine deliberative processing. In one study that illustrates
this point, Finucane et al. had subjects judge the risks and benefits of dif-
ferent technologies, such as nuclear power and cell phones, giving them
either ample time or insufficient time (five seconds) to make judgments.
26
Ecologically, risks and benefits tend to be negatively correlated because
greater risks are only tolerated when the benefits conferred are commensu-
rate. However, based on prior work on what Slovic calls the "affect heuris-
tic," the authors hypothesized and found that people tended to judge
technologies with high benefits as low in risk and vice versa. 27 Technolo-
gies that elicit a negative reaction, such as nuclear power, are judged nega-
tively on all dimensions; those that evoke a positive reaction, such as wind
power, are judged positively on all dimensions. The key finding with re-
spect to time delay, however, was that the correlation between people's
judgments of risk and benefit were even more negative when people made
these judgments under time pressure. With sufficient time to think, they
were to some extent able to correct their gut-level response.
28
Affect and deliberation are not, of course, independent processes.
There is, for example, good evidence that affective inputs are essential to
deliberative decision making. People with brain injuries that interrupt the
flow of affective signals to the prefrontal cortex have trouble making deci-
sions, and, when they do, they often make bad decisions.29 Likewise, ex-
periments in which people are robbed of affective inputs into decision
24. Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and
Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 282 (1999).
25. Id. at 285.
26. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 413, 420 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
27. Id. at 420; Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 7, at 397.
28. Finucane et al., supra note 26, at 420.




making find that people tend to make poorer decisions3 0-at least for
choices in which "gut feel" should obviously play a role, such as between
different dishes at a restaurant. 31 Indeed, even in the domain of law, there
seem to be situations in which raw feelings of "outrage" lead to more rea-
sonable and systematic judgments than more deliberately chosen monetary
levels of punitive damages. 32
Affect can also distort and disrupt deliberative processing in various
ways. Under the sway of powerful emotions, people are ready to believe
almost anything. People who are desperately ill, or whose children are ill,
are often ready to embrace quack remedies, contrary to all scientific evi-
dence. And people who feel attacked will be ready to believe almost any-
thing about their enemies. For example, many Arabs believe that the World
Trade Center attacks were a Jewish conspiracy, and many Iraqis believe
that the roadside bombs that kill so many civilians and soldiers are actually
the work of Americans. The disparate perceptions of blacks and whites
regarding the O.J. Simpson case likewise probably stemmed in part from
powerful underlying emotions.
In sum, human decision making does not seem adequately described
by the unitary decision model that dominates economics. Instead, it can
usefully be described as the outcome of interactions between two qualita-
tively different processes, one involving a deliberative response to the an-
ticipated consequences of a decision, and the other involving a more
reflexive response to emotions experienced at the time of decision making.
This poses a serious challenge to economics and to the economic account
of law, both of which focus almost exclusively on the deliberative dimen-
sion of behavior. 33
30. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction,
19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331 (1993); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler,
Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991).
31. Murray G. Millar & Abraham Tesser, Effects of Affective and Cognitive Focus on the Attitude-
Behavior Relation, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 270-76 (1986).
32. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards:
The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998).
33. Perhaps part of the reason that social scientists have tended to underappreciate the role played
by emotions in behavior and to exaggerate the role of deliberation is that people generally tend to make
this mistake. Part of the reason is that emote control invokes automatic, affective processes that are
"cognitively inaccessible"; deliberation, in contrast, relies on cognitive processes that are accessible to
some degree. Another contributing factor may be the tendency for people who are in "hot" affective
states tend to underappreciate the extent to which their preferences and behavioral inclinations are
influenced by their affective state; they typically believe that they are behaving more dispassionately
than they actually are. People who are in cold states-who are not affectively aroused--on the other
hand, tend to underestimate the extent to which being in an affective state would influence their percep-
tions and behavior. See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996).
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF EMOTE CONTROL
Why should economists, or legal academics who draw on economics,
care about the details of how the brain makes decisions? What does it mat-
ter if economic behavior is the product of one system or two? As Milton
Friedman famously argued, economics should not be concerned with un-
derlying process. 34 Utility maximization implies not that people explicitly
deliberate about the costs and benefits of alternative options for behavior,
but only that they behave as if they do.
This would be a valid argument if behavior was, in fact, well ex-
plained by the traditional model, but it is not. In fact, the affective proc-
esses that drive human behavior often propel people in directions very
different from those that would be dictated by deliberation. The distinction
between deliberative and emote control of behavior matters exactly because
these two different modes lead to different attitudes and behavior.
Affect and deliberation diverge because the two systems respond to
different stimuli and to the same stimuli in different ways. Consider, for
example, the case of a dieter who encounters an available snack. On the
one hand, the sight of the snack serves as a reminder of the diet, triggering
a deliberate intention to resist the temptation. On the other hand, the sight
of the snack is likely to trigger neural programs that motivate eating when
food is readily available--especially food with high fat content. In cases
such as this, affect and deliberation can propel behavior in opposite direc-
By the same token, people tend to exaggerate the role of deliberative decision making in their
own behavior. When asked to introspect about the causes of their behavior, however, most people
report that their actions are the product of deliberative decisions, Phillip Pettit, Decision Theory and
Folk Psychology, in FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION THEORY: ISSUES AND ADVANCES (Michael Bacharach
& Susan Hurley eds., 1991), even when this is demonstrably not the case. For example, research by
Robert Zajonc and his colleagues has found that people tend to like things they are exposed to repeat-
edly-a phenomenon they term the "mere exposure effect." Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of
Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENT 1 (1968). However,
because people are unaware of the effect, when their preferences are experimentally influenced through
differential exposure, and they are asked to explain their tastes, they readily generate attribute-based
explanations for their own preferences. See Robert B. Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affective and Cognitive
Factors in Preferences, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 123 (1982). A subject might decide that he likes polygon
number three, for example, not because he viewed it twelve times, but due to its geometric symmetry.
In other research, a "split-brain" patient whose right hemisphere could interpret language but not speak,
and whose left hemisphere could speak was instructed to wave his hand by showing the word "wave"
on the left part of a visual screen, which only the right hemisphere processed. JOSEPH LEDOUx, THE
EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996). The left hemi-
sphere saw the right hand waving but was unaware of the instructions that had been given to the right
hemisphere (because the cross-hemisphere connections were severed). When the patient was asked why
he waved, the left hemisphere invariably came up with a plausible explanation, such as "I saw some-
body I knew and waved at them." See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA & JOSEP4 LEDOUX, THE INTEGRATED
MIND 146-51 (1978).




tions. As another example, many people experience intense fear when they
fly even though they recognize that the risks are minuscule, and little fear
while driving, even though they recognize that driving is far more danger-
ous than flying. To understand these and other situations in which emote
control and deliberative control of behavior clash, we need a better under-
standing of what factors have a differential impact on affect and delibera-
tion. Fortunately, prior research has identified several such factors.
Temporal proximity: The case of the dieter illustrates one of the most
important factors that produce a divergence of emote and deliberative con-
trol of behavior: temporal proximity. Immediate emotions are highly tuned
to temporal proximity; affective systems kick in when rewards and pun-
ishments are immediate but not when they are remote. Deliberation is, in
contrast, much less sensitive to immediacy.
In a study that demonstrates this effect, McClure et al. scanned sub-
jects' brains using fMR135 while they made choices between earlier/smaller
and larger/later money rewards. 36 Some of the choices were between
money amounts that would be received that day and larger amounts that
would be delayed by two or four weeks. Other choices were between
money amounts that were all delayed-e.g., $5 in two weeks versus $7 in
four weeks. The authors predicted and found that all decisions activated
areas of the brain that are commonly associated with analytical operations
such as mathematical calculations. 37 However, when one of the alternatives
of a choice was immediate, additional brain regions came into play, spe-
cifically regions that are commonly associated with affective processing,
including those associated with the midbrain dopamine system and the
paralimbic cortex. Furthermore, for choices that did include an option for
immediate gratification, the relative engagement of the two systems sig-
nificantly predicted subjects' choices, with greater relative fronto-parietal
activity when subjects chose longer-term options and greater relative affec-
tive activity when subjects chose the shorter-term options. 38
The passage of time is important not only prospectively, but also ret-
rospectively. Just as the affective system tends to overweigh prospective
costs and benefits that are imminent or immediate, it tends to exaggerate
the importance of events that have happened in the very recent past. This is
35. fMRI is functional magnetic resonance imaging, a technique used to monitor patterns of brain
activation.
36. Samuel M. McClure, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein & Jonathan D. Cohen, Separate
Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter McClure et al.]. Monetary rewards took the form of Amazon.com gift certificates.
37. Specifically, the lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex.
38. McClure et al., supra note 36.
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one reason why we often observe a kind of "sorting out" as events move
into the past. In the middle of the situation-in the heat of the moment-
we lose perspective and often overreact to things that are unimportant just
because they are immediate. As events recede into the past, however, and
the passions of the moment diminish, one typically gains a more even-
handed perspective, much as one learns which buildings in a city are tallest
only after driving to the periphery. Affect, as discussed earlier, is inherently
myopic; it lacks a long-term temporal perspective and effectively gets
caught up in the "heat of the moment." Deliberation can be powerfully
swayed by affect in the short-term, but in the long-term, it tends to adopt a
more evenhanded perspective.
Adaptation: In Jon Krakauer's modem classic Into Thin Air, the au-
thor recounts the extreme shock he experienced the first time he encoun-
tered a climber's dead body on Mount Everest. 39 However, when he
encountered a second body shortly thereafter, his reaction already was
much diminished: "the first body had left me badly shaken for several
hours; the shock of encountering the second wore off almost immedi-
ately."4 0 Krakauer's dramatically different reaction to the first and second
bodies illustrates an important feature of many affective subsystems; they
are sensitive to changes in things-to situations that appear to be new-but
adapt to ongoing or repeated stimuli. The deliberative system, in contrast,
is typically much more sensitive to levels-to ongoing, stable situations. At
a cognitive level, Krakauer was aware that the second body was equivalent
to the first-both were horrible-but at an emotional level, he reacted
strongly to the first and only mildly to the second.
4 1
There are good reasons for the affective system to adapt to ongoing
stimuli. Affective processes serve important motivational and regulatory
functions. We did not evolve to be happy; we evolved to survive and re-
produce, and affective systems are designed to serve that purpose. 42 Nega-
tive affective states put us on notice that something is wrong and motivate
us to change. Positive affective states provide immediate reward when we
rectify whatever is wrong. Thus, for example, when our body temperature
drops, blood flow is progressively reduced to peripheral regions of the
39. JONATHAN KRAKAUER, INTO THIN AIR (1997).
40. Id. at 107.
41. Adaptation is a common theme in historical accounts of atrocities. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER R.
BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND
(1993); JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2000).
42, See, e.g., Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness (Chicago




body, heart rate tends to decrease, and our brains instigate emotional pro-
grams designed to motivate us to seek out warmth. We experience discom-
fort, and almost anything that raises our body temperature becomes
pleasurable-a process called "alliesthesia." It takes deliberation to resist
these influences, to recognize that we need to jump into the cold pool to get
exercise or that we should keep jogging on a hot day.
Vividness: A third important property of the affective system is that it
is highly attuned to visual imagery, whereas the deliberative system is
much more keyed in to the logic of costs and benefits.
In a series of studies that illustrate the impact of vividness, Small and
Loewenstein examined a phenomenon that Thomas Schelling labeled the
"identifiable victim effect." 43 The paradigmatic illustration of the identifi-
able victim effect and its often absurd consequences is the case of Jessica
McClure, an eighteen-month-old who fell into a well in Texas in 1987 and
received an outpouring of sympathy, including donations totaling more
than $700,000. 4
4
The identifiable victim effect is difficult to demonstrate empirically
because, if one shows that people are more responsive to identified victims,
it may be the specific characteristics of the victim, rather than identification
per se, that make the difference. Small and Loewenstein got around this
problem by, in effect, identifying victims without providing any informa-
tion about them. In the first of a series of studies examining the phenome-
non, they assigned each member of a group of research participants a
number and gave each $10. Based on a drawing of numbers, half of the
participants, the "victims," were then made to return the money. Partici-
pants who had retained the $10 were then given the opportunity to share
their money with one of those who had lost their money. In the identifiable
condition, the potential giverfirst drew the number of one victim from a
bag, then decided how much to give to that victim (knowing, however, that
she would never learn the actual identity of the victim). In the unidentifi-
able condition, in contrast, the potential giver decided how much to give
just before drawing the victim's number. Donations were about twice as
large, on average, in the identifiable condition as in the unidentifiable con-
dition, despite the fact that "identifying" the victims provided no informa-
tion about them.45 Follow-up research, in which people were given the
43. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism
and Identifiabilty, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003); T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be
Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr., ed., 1968).
44. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 43, at 5.
45. Id. at 7-11.
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opportunity to donate money to the charitable organization Habitat for
Humanity, revealed a similar effect in a more naturalistic setting.
Categorization: A fourth important property of emote control is its
sensitivity to mental categories. Categorization is an automatic process.
Whenever we encounter a person or an object, we immediately and auto-
matically classify it. We classify things not only according to what they
are--e.g., a book, a person, or a dog, but, perhaps even more immediately,
we classify things according to whether they are good or bad. Diverse re-
search shows that people can often identify their affective reaction to some-
thing (whether they like it or not) more rapidly than they can even say what
it is.46 The human brain affectively tags virtually all objects and concepts,
and these affective tags are brought to mind effortlessly and automatically
when we encounter objects and concepts. 47 Such affective reactions to
things can be dissociated from memory for details of those things, with the
former often being better. For example, we often remember whether we
liked or disliked a particular person, book, or movie without being able to
remember any other details.
48
From the perspective of law and social policy, one of the most impor-
tant forms of categorization is the distinction between "us" and "them.' '49
People react much more strongly to positive or negative outcomes experi-
enced by those whom they consider to be part of their own group than to
those whom they consider to be outside their own group (except perhaps
when it comes to emotions such as anger). However, exactly what consti-
tutes one's group, i.e. "us," can be quite arbitrary and hence context de-
pendent. Thus, for example, even though Yucca Mountain, the federal
government's proposed high-level nuclear waste repository, is right on the
border with California and closer to many California population centers
46. Robert B. Zajone, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 154 (1980); Robert B. Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
117 (1984); Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591-632
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
47. See, e.g., Russel H. Fazio et al., On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Unconscious Processing of Dichoptically
Masked Words, 17 MEMORY & COGNITION 35 (1989); Anthony G. Greenwald, New Look 3: Uncon-
scious Cognition Reclaimed, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 766 (1992); John A. Bargh et al., The Automatic
Evaluation Effect: Unconditional Automatic Attitude Activation with a Pronunciation Task, 32 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 104 (1996); Dirk Hermans, Jan De Houwer & Paul Eelen, Evaluative
Decision Latencies Mediated by Induced Affective States, 34 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 483 (1996);
David A. Houston & Russell H. Fazio, Biased Processing as a Function of Attitude Accessibility:
Making Objective Judgments Subjectively, 7 SOC. COGNITION 51 (1989).
48. John A. Bargh, Automatic and Conscious Processing of Social Information, in 3 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 33-37 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984).
49. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
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than to population centers in Nevada, the citizens of Nevada were far more
upset about the nuclear waste's placement than were the citizens of Cali-
fornia. 50 Because social categories are so arbitrary, they can also be easily
manipulated by those with an agenda, as demagogues well understand.
Almost any social classification, whether it be along the lines of religion,
social class, or nation, can be made into a fault line if it is highlighted in an
evocative fashion.51
In sum, emote control is generally much more sensitive to the specific
timing of outcomes (especially to the distinction between immediate and
delayed) than is deliberative control, and emote control is also more sensi-
tive to repetition, vividness, and often arbitrary categorization than is delib-
eration. These are a few of the most important factors that drive a wedge
between anticipated and immediate affect-between deliberative and emote
control of behavior.
III. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
War is the quintessential issue where immediate emotion and passions
hold sway, often at the expense of an evaluation of long-term conse-
quences. Our legal system has long recognized this tendency and attempts
to provide constitutional and statutory safeguards to ensure that a decision
to go to war be made deliberately and not impulsively.
The Constitution gives the power to authorize war to Congress. The
Framers chose so for a number of reasons, several of which are particularly
relevant for this Article. They realized that decisions to go to war would
often be driven by immediate passions and emotions, which might run con-
trary to the long-term national interest. The Framers believed that immedi-
ate emotions might particularly affect the executive branch's decision
making about whether to go to war. James Madison wrote that "war is in
fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement," because "[t]he strongest
passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast: ambition,
avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy
against the desire and duty of peace."52 Clearly a significant concern moti-
vating the Framers was that the executive might act on emotional impulse,
without calculating or adequately considering the long-term consequences.
50. Even more absurdly, in part due to the qualms of these Nevada residents, large amounts of
high-level nuclear waste are currently stored in much more primitive and dangerous storage facilities
surrounding nuclear reactors, many of them close to population centers.
51. Moses Shayo, Nation, Class and Redistribution, Applying Social Identity Research to Political
Economy (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with authors).
52. JAMES MADISON, Helvidius No. 4, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1906); see also TI-E FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay).
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
Of course, although it was hoped that the president would only decide to go
to war after careful deliberation, the possibility that the president would act
rashly and without sufficient consideration of the national interest was too
strong to ignore, and therefore a check had to be placed on executive
power.
To ensure that immediate emotions or purely personal ambition did
not draw us into war, the Constitution charges Congress with the power to
declare war. As Justice Story wrote, the decision to go to war is so poten-
tially "critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and
the successive review of all the councils of the nation." 53 That the constitu-
tional framework was designed to permit reflection on long-term conse-
quences can be seen in comments of critical Framers such as James Wilson,
who wrote that the constitutional "system will not hurry us into war" and
was designed to ensure "that nothing but our national interest can draw us
into a war."' 54 The metaphor Thomas Jefferson evoked, that the War Decla-
ration Clause was designed to chain "the Dog of war," suggests the same
point: that the animalistic, automatic barking of dogs at any sign of distur-
bance would be restrained by rational thought.55 As one scholar has ex-
pressed it, the Framers intended that congressional authorization would
slow the process to insure a pause, a "sober second thought," before the
nation plunged into war.56 Only when there was no time for deliberation or
reflection, when the nation had to repel a sudden attack, could the president
use force unilaterally.
The original constitutional framework was thus premised on a clear
dichotomy between situations in which "emote control" would essentially
take over, and the president could act almost automatically, and those that
required the deliberation of Congress. The language "repel sudden attacks,"
used at the Constitutional Convention, clearly suggested the dichotomy.
When another person suddenly attacks you, there is no time for controlled
deliberation; you act immediately, automatically, and reflexively to block
53. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1166, at
60(1833).
54. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (1836); see also 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 50 (1826) ("[T]he power of declaring war.., is wisely confided to the legislature of the Union;
and the presumption is, that nothing short of a strong case deeply affecting our essential rights.., will
ever prevail upon Congress to declare war.").
55. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Letter to James Madison, in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) ("We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of
war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from
those who are to spend to those who are to pay.").
56. JOHN HART ELY, WAR & RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 4 (1993).
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the punch or to otherwise act in self-defense. In all other situations involv-
ing American use of force, the Framers assumed that the slow and con-
trolled process of Congressional deliberation as to the consequences for the
nation, both long-term and immediate, would apply.
This original constitutional understanding broke down in the last half
of the twentieth century, as presidents asserted broad war powers and Con-
gress generally abdicated its responsibility to carefully consider decisions
to go to war. In most cases, Congress simply did nothing, and the president
acted unilaterally. 57 The constitutional requirement of deliberation by "the
successive reviews of all the councils of the nation" simply failed to
operate.
In other cases, such as the enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion, which was taken to have authorized the Vietnam War, Congress acted
"with great speed and in the heat of emotion" to accord the president broad
authority to do virtually anything. 58 The passage of that Resolution and the
resulting legal and political struggle over the constitutionality of the war in
Vietnam illustrate some of the mechanisms by which emote control oper-
ates either as a substitute or often as an underpinning for what appears to be
deliberative, consequentialist decision making.
In early August 1964, the Johnson Administration claimed that North
Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the American destroyers Turner Joy and
the Maddux in separate incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. U.S. warplanes
almost immediately retaliated by bombing four North Vietnamese patrol
boat bases, and on August 7th, Congress enacted the Gulf of Tonkin Reso-
lution, which explicitly accorded the president the power "to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting
assistance in defense of its freedom." 59 By the time various presidents had
finished using force in defense of South Vietnam, the American war in
Southeast Asia had become the longest in our history, the second most
expensive monetarily, and had cost almost 58,000 American lives.
Yet the possibility of such consequences clearly was not considered at
the time. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed the House of Representa-
tives with virtually no discussion and unanimously by a vote of 416-0, and
the Resolution passed by a nearly unanimous vote in the Senate, with only
57. Id. at 49.
58. Id. at 19 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 15,409 (1970) (statement of Professor Alexander M. Bickel et
al.)).
59. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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Senators Morse and Gruening dissenting.60 The contrast to the lengthy
Congressional debates that preceded each incremental grant of authority
given to President John Adams to wage the undeclared and limited war
with France in the late 1790s and the seventeen days of Congressional de-
liberation that resulted in the declaration of the War of 1812 could not be
starker. 61 In 1964, not only the Congressional but the nation's response to
the purported North Vietnamese attack was highly emotional, immediate,
vivid, and automatic as well as popular with the public: the only two Sena-
tors who voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution were defeated in their
next election campaigns.
6 2
Despite the explicit language of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, sena-
tors and congressmen later denied that they understood the consequences of
voting for it. For example, Senator William Fulbright, Chair of the Foreign
Relations Committee and the administration's floor manager for the Reso-
lution, later claimed that he had been "unaware of the significance of the
measure" and that its passage "must stand as the only instance in the na-
tion's history in which Congress authorized war without knowing that it
was doing so."
'63
One explanation for this later recantation is mere cynical political cal-
culation. Having voted on the Resolution for calculated political reasons,
Fulbright and others scrambled for cover once the war went sour. In addi-
tion, some like Fulbright legitimately felt duped by the Johnson Admini-
stration. Yet Fulbright clearly hit on a phenomenon that many people later
felt: while the language of the Resolution was clear and while he clearly
understood that language (and indeed opposed an amendment to delete or
limit the broad authorization), in a profounder sense emote control had
taken over in response to the immediate crisis, so that Congress had indeed
not considered the significance or potential consequences of enacting the
Resolution. Even those senators who had expressed reservations about the
consequences of what they were doing overrode those doubts with the emo-
60. 110 Cong. Rec. 18,470-71, 18,555 (1964); ELY, supra note 56, at 19.
61. See GEOFFREY PERRET, A COUNTRY MADE BY WAR: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO VIETNAM-
THE STORY OF AMERICA'S RISE TO POWER 105-06 (1989), noting that deliberation for the declaration
of the War of 1812 lasted for seventeen days. See also ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at 90-96 (1966),
detailing the lengthy sequence of congressional acts escalating U.S. action against France.
62. ELY, supra note 56, at 19.




tional, gut feeling that they had to support the president and not exercise
their independent judgment.
64
These problems with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution led some to later
question whether the Vietnam War had been constitutionally authorized.
However, as scholars such as John Hart Ely have argued, Congress' failure
to consider the potential consequences of what it was voting on cannot be
used to justify legally depriving the president of the constitutional authority
that was indeed granted by the Resolution. 65 Irrespective of the constitu-
tionality of the Vietnam War in particular, such superficial, impulsive, and
emotional consideration of a decision to authorize warfare is contrary to the
purpose of the constitutional allocation of war power to Congress, namely
to ensure considered, careful deliberation of such grave decisions.
The lack of deliberate Congressional decision making over decisions
to use force in such disparate places as Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and the
Dominican Republic resulted from a profound sense of crisis that pervaded
post-World War II America. As Arthur Schlesinger wrote:
[T]he belief that the world was greatly endangered by the spread of
communism had generated a profound conviction of crisis in the United
States; and the conviction of crisis had generated a foreign policy that
placed the separation of powers prescribed by the American Constitution
under unprecedented and at times unbearable strain.6
6
Schlesinger describes this sense of crisis in psychological terms as border-
ing on neurosis, as engendering "delusions," and as a foreign policy "under
the hypnosis of crisis."'67 Indeed, Fulbright himself had argued just three
years before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that traditional democratic
separation of powers principles had to yield to the need for strong execu-
tive power to meet the new situation and to ensure "survival" in a world of
"aggressive totalitarianism."6 8
This sense of crisis muddied or even collapsed the temporal frame-
work that, as we have seen, underlies the division of war powers under the
Constitution. The president's power to use military force was carefully
limited temporally to repelling sudden attacks that required an immediate,
almost automatic response in the absence of time for deliberation. By the
late-twentieth century, however, some were advocating a liberalization of
64. See, for example, the statement of Senator George Aiken "I feel that 1, an American citizen,
can do no less than support the President in his capacity as leader of our nation." 110 Cong. Rec. 18,457
(1964).
65. ELY, supra note 56, at 21.
66. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 163 (1973),
67. Id. at 164.
68. J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1961).
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the concept of "sudden attack" to include all threats to national security
based on the rationale that the interdependence of the twentieth-century
world meant that any such threat might "impinge directly upon the nation's
security."'69 The development of nuclear weapons and consequent possibil-
ity of imminent annihilation, in particular, led some commentators to argue
that it was no longer appropriate "to distinguish between the emergency
powers of the Executive and the nonemergency policy prerogatives of the
legislature."'70 Careful deliberation was perceived of as an outmoded luxury
in a world confronted by perpetual crisis. To avert annihilation, decisions
needed to be made in minutes, not days. These tendencies favored emote
control over the more deliberative processes contemplated by the Constitu-
tion.
The national trauma caused by the Vietnam War led Congress to at-
tempt to reassert its authority and responsibility in order to bring deliberate
decision making back into decisions to use force against another country.
In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, which sought to
limit the Commander in Chief's powers by restoring the offensive defen-
sive distinction central to maintaining the boundary line between war and
peace. 71 Section 2 of the Resolution permits the Commander in Chief to
introduce armed forces into hostilities only where there has been an "attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."
72
However, that section is merely hortatory, with no enforcement. 73 The
Resolution's main attempt to limit executive power is temporal and proce-
dural. Congress tried to restrict the president's use of troops in hostile situa-
tions by placing a cap of sixty days on the period during which the
president can deploy armed forces without congressional permission.
74
Congress recognized, moreover, that powerful emotional factors drove
most of its members to prefer not to vote on whether to authorize American
use of military force, so as to avoid opposing a president who claims that
69. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, The Legality of United States Participation in the
Defense of Vietnam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1965); WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Congress, The President,
and the War Powers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1194, 1197 (1971).
70. Yonkel Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the Nuclear
Age: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (1988).
71. S. REP. NO. 93-220, at 21 (1973) (stating that war and peace in the American constitutional
system are separate and distinct and that the purpose of the bill is to restore that distinction); id. at 3
(citing Bickel for the proposition that restoring the balance in war powers is "one of line-drawing, of
separating one thing from another").
72. 50 U.S.C. § 154 1(c) (2000).
73. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1379 (1988); Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J. 1330, 1335-36 (1984).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The president could extend the authority for one thirty-day period, after
which it would automatically terminate. Id.
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armed force is needed and to abjure responsibility for a Vietnam-like deba-
cle. Therefore, faithful to the constitutional scheme, the War Powers Reso-
lution required affirmative Congressional approval of force. If Congress
simply refused to vote or could not muster sufficient institutional willpower
to vote, the president was required to withdraw the troops.75
In addition, the War Powers Resolution specifically rejected the view
that subsequent Congressional votes approving funds to continue a war
counted as authorization of the war.76 It did so based on the position ex-
pressed by some courts and many members of Congress that legislators are
emotionally forced to vote for appropriations: not to do so would abandon
the troops in the field. As Senator George McGovern put it when voting for
appropriations to continue the Vietnam War: "It involves more the throw-
ing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he
got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and a mem-
ber of our family." 77
The explanation is actually irrational, because cutting off appropria-
tions means that any sane president would withdraw the troops rather than
leave them to fight defenseless, but the immediate appeal of the "support
our troops" argument usually outweighs any rational consideration of the
merits of voting for or against funding. In any event, the War Powers Reso-
lution was designed to force considered, deliberate Congressional consid-
eration of whether military force was used and therefore proscribed
techniques, such as authorization through appropriations, in which emo-
tional appeals to immediate concerns would steamroll consideration of
long-term consequences.
Virtually all observers now recognize the War Powers Resolution to
have been a failure. 78 Every president since Nixon has violated the Resolu-
75. Id
76. Id § 1547(a)(1).
77. 112 Cong. Rec. 4404, 4409 (1966).
78. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 56, at 49 ("[T]he War Powers Resolution has not worked."); Tho-
mas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or by "Thaumaturgic Invocation "?, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 766, 768 (1989) ("It is sobering and instructive to examine the extent of this failure and its causes.");
William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
695, 770 (1997) ("Moreover, Congress has no motive to try to stop the President from initiating conflict
(as the failure of Congress to respond to presidential disregard of the War Powers Resolution illus-
trates)."); Ronald J. Seivert, Campbell v. Clinton and the Continuing Effort to Reassert Congress'
Predominant Constitutional Authority to Commence, or Prevent, War, 105 DICK. L. REV. 157, 166
(2001) ("Those who thought the War Powers Resolution might be a panacea that would halt military
adventurism and permit Congress to resume control over foreign affairs were soon disappointed.");
Patrick D. Robbins, Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38
AM. U.L. REV. 141, 144 (1988) ("[T]his Comment argues that the failure of the executive, legislature,
and judiciary to apply the War Powers Resolution in any meaningful way and the near certain unconsti-
tutionality of some of its provisions have rendered the law a dead letter.").
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tion, often repeatedly. Congress has generally acquiesced in such executive
violations. No president has ever filed a report starting the sixty-day clock,
despite repeated executive introduction of armed forces into hostile situa-
tions in Southeast Asia, Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada, Libya,
the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia.79 Congress has challenged this
noncompliance only once, without a decisive result.80 The judiciary has
refused to adjudicate claims challenging executive action as violative of the
Resolution, holding that a challenge by over 100 Congressmen to the
armed presence in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s was nonjusticiable, as
was a similar challenge to President Clinton's air war against Yugoslavia in
1997.81
The Bush Administration did seek and obtain Congressional authori-
zation for the Afghanistan military campaign and the war against Iraq.
These two examples do not disprove the general practice since 1973: where
the president is able to use a deeply emotional issue, which can be por-
trayed as immediate, to justify war, he can convince Congress and may
even request Congressional authorization. Where Congressional authoriza-
tion may not be forthcoming, such as for Clinton's air strikes on Serbia in
Kosovo or the continuous bombing of Iraq during the Clinton and Bush
Administrations prior to the March 2003 attack on Iraq, the administration
will not involve Congress, Congress will not object, and the courts will not
intervene.
Indeed, the war against Iraq illustrates problems of executive and con-
gressional decision making paralleling those that surfaced with the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution. In Iraq, as in Vietnam, the House and Senate voted
overwhelmingly to authorize war despite dubious evidence as to the rea-
sons for the war and despite skepticism of some members of Congress.
82
Again, as in Vietnam, the compelling argument for many members of Con-
gress was not based on an evaluation of the anticipated consequences of the
war in Iraq, but instead on the perceived immediate necessity to accord the
president broad power to deal with an evil force in the world that threatens
our very survival. 83 Indeed many, including John Kerry, claimed that they
79. Ely, supra note 73, at 1381 & n.8.
80. The one occasion was the Lebanon crisis, when Congress negotiated a "compromise" with the
Reagan Administration permitting troops to remain in Lebanon for eighteen months. Id. at 1381; Mi-
chael J. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution: Sad Record, Dismal Promise, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 657,
667 (1984).
81. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F.
Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1987).
82. 148 Cong. Rec. H7739-799, S10284-342 (2002).
83. See, for example, the statement of Rep. John Linder:
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voted to give the president authority but assumed that he would use that
authority wisely, an argument reminiscent of Fulbright's ex post explana-
tion of his vote on the Tonkin Resolution. 84 Most ominously, the terrorist
threat has raised the crisis mentality to a new level, exceeding even that of
the Cold War, in which the need to repel potential threats before they mate-
rialize eliminates whatever vestige of the distinction between self-defensive
and offensive action that survived the Cold War.
The refusal of Democratic and Republican presidents to abide by the
War Powers Resolution, and the over-reliance on emotional appeals to
decide whether to go to war, illustrates that the war powers problem is
deeply rooted in human psychology, not particular ideologies. The failure
of the War Powers Resolution requires not merely technocratic or policy
reforms, but rather new types of mechanisms that are grounded in a more
thoroughgoing understanding of the role of emotion in human decision
making.
The war against terrorism also illustrates the effect of affect or emote
control on governmental policy and law. The tragic, vivid, and compelling
events of September 11 set in motion an emotional reaction by both gov-
ernmental officials and the population that overwhelmed any rational or
objective assessment of either the risks terrorists present or the policy
choices to confront terrorism.
First, the September 11 attacks were repeatedly viewed as presenting a
"new" situation, thereby triggering a stronger emotional reaction than the
Mr. Speaker, what cannot be disputed today is that peace and freedom are the ends to which
we now seek our means. President Bush has demonstrated the courage to lead and to draw a
line in the sand. Now is the time for Congress to support his leadership. I am proud to join a
broad bipartisan coalition of Members by standing up to tyranny and oppression and opposi-
tion to freedom by voting no on this amendment. By rejecting this spurious amendment we
will ensure that America's promise to uphold the rule of law and to protect the peace-loving
people of the world actually has meaning.
148 Cong. Rec. H7741-42 (2002) (statement ofRep. Linder).
84. See, for example, John Kerry's statement in the presidential debate of September 30, 2004:
And from the beginning, I did vote to give the authority, because I thought Saddam Hussein
was a threat, and I did accept that intelligence.
But I also laid out a very strict series of things we needed to do in order to proceed from a po-
sition of strength. Then the president, in fact, promised them. He went to Cincinnati and he
gave a speech in which he said, "We will plan carefully. We will proceed cautiously. We will
not make war inevitable. We will go with our allies."
He didn't do any of those things. They didn't do the planning.
Kerry, however, voted against an amendment that would have legally required the president to get
the consent of our allies at the United Nations, choosing, just as Fulbright had forty years earlier,
to give the president a broad authorization and rely on presidential promises instead of limiting the
president's authority. Commission on Presidential Debates, 2004 Debate Transcript (Sept. 30,
2004), available at http://debates.org/pages/trans2004a.htm.
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emotions occasioned by an equivalent or even stronger danger that is ex-
perienced as ongoing and "not new." In contrast, locating September Il as
a particular heinous incident in the ongoing war against terrorism (which
government officials have been waging for at least two decades) would
undoubtedly have focused dialogue in a more deliberative mode of re-
sponse. However, in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
government officials, the media, and academics focused on this "new"
paradigm now confronting the United States. As President Bush argued
after September 11: "In the new world we have entered, the path to peace
and security is the path of action. '85 President Bush returned to that refrain
in a February 7, 2002, order stating that the "war against terrorism ushers in
a new paradigm... ushered in not by us, but by terrorists. '86
It is questionable whether the September 11 attacks really were
"new. "87 Certainly, the scale of the destruction was on a dramatically
higher order than the attacks of the 1980s and 90s against targets as diverse
as the World Trade Center, U.S. embassies, airlines, etc. But merely be-
cause the level of destruction was substantially greater than prior attacks
does not make the situation new.
The perception of the September 11 attacks as ushering in a new era
was a powerful emotional motivation for changes in legal doctrine that
might not survive rational scrutiny. That the United States is facing a new
situation has been utilized to justify (a) changing international legal rules
on the use of force to permit preemptive self-defense; 88 (b) not applying the
Geneva Conventions to alleged terrorists; 89 (c) detaining people without
charges or trial; and (d) a very narrow definition of torture permitting coer-
cive interrogation for the purpose of obtaining vital information from al-
leged terrorists. Although each of these changes has been the subject of
rational debate and discourse, the perception that the problem of terrorism
was in some sense "new", encouraged an affective response to the problem
that discouraged and distorted rational debate. Had the problem been
85. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, Introduction
(2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.white-
house.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
86. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees, Point I (Feb. 7 2002) [hereinafter Humane Treatment Memo], available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.02.07.pdf.
87. See SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
88. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 85, at 6.
89. See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, to President George W. Bush, Subject: Decision Re
Application of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Queda and the
Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) ("In my judgment this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limita-
tions on questioning of enemy prisoners .... ); see also Humane Treatment Memo, supra note 86,
point I ([T]he "new paradigm.., requires new thinking in the law of war.").
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viewed in a more historical context, in contrast, deliberative processes
could have potentially exerted a larger influence on the actions that ensued.
Second, affective responses to the threat of terrorism were certainly
heightened by the powerful visual imagery that the September II attacks
afforded-e.g., the footage of planes hitting the World Trade Center that
was shown with numbing repetitiveness in the days following the attack.
As discussed in the last section, it is well-documented that people tend to
exaggerate small risks that engage strong emotions. For example, people
are willing to spend more money countering terrorists' threats than promot-
ing highway safety, although the latter would undoubtedly statistically save
more lives.
In the terrorism context, Cass Sunstein has discussed one aspect of
this phenomenon that he terms "probability neglect," a problem exacer-
bated when emotions are intensively engaged.90 Probability neglect occurs
when people overreact to minor risks, particularly when those risks trigger
strong emotions. People in these circumstances focus on the bad outcome
itself, irrespective of the fact that it is very unlikely to occur. Sunstein
argues:
The conclusion is that many people will pay a significant amount to
avoid a small probability of a hazard that is affectively-laden-and that
when strong emotions are involved, the amount that they will pay will
not vary greatly with changes in probability. In the context of terrorism,
the implication is clear. The risks associated with terrorist attacks are
highly likely to trigger strong emotions, in part because of the sheer viv-
idness of the bad outcome and the associated levels of outrage and fear.
It follows that even if the likelihood of an attack is extremely low, people
will be willing to pay a great deal to avoid it.91
When strong emotions are involved, Sunstein shows, people often pay
little attention to the objective probability of the risks they face and react
similarly to a risk that has a 1% chance of occurring and a risk that has a
.001% chance of eventuating.
In the case of terrorism, such probability neglect can distort policy.
The imposition of time-consuming screening procedures at airports may
lead more people to drive rather than fly. Because flying is safer than driv-
ing, even assuming a steady rate of terrorists attack, on balance more peo-
ple might die as a result of exaggerated antiterrorism precautions.
Similarly, the exaggeration of risk because of vivid emotional reaction
90. Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 122
(2003).
91. Id at 124.
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might lead the population and the government to discard or reverse civil
liberties when the nature of the risk may not warrant such action.
The problem of vivid, emotional miscalculation of risk is particularly
acute in the antiterrorism context, since fear is a particularly strong emo-
tion, impervious to deliberate calculation. As Edmund Burke once ob-
served, "[n]o passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting
and reasoning as fear." 92
Third, the emotionality of the response to terrorism in the aftermath of
the September 1 1 attacks was exacerbated by the factor of temporal imme-
diacy. The fact that the terrorist attack was sudden and unpredictable pro-
duced the type of immediacy that evokes emotional decision making. For
example, within a few months of the September 11 attacks, Congress en-
acted the USA PATRIOT Act containing significant restrictions of the
liberties of American citizens and rights of aliens.93 The PATRIOT Act
was rushed through Congress with great speed and an almost complete lack
of informed discourse, based on the notion that the crisis required immedi-
ate action. 94 The Act is both complex and voluminous. 95 Yet the Act was
not read by key members of Congress prior to its passage. 96 The committee
process and floor debate were bypassed; the asserted reason was that Con-
gress had to act quickly to thwart terrorist attacks believed to be
impending.
97
The enactment of the Patriot Act, like virtually all policy or legislative
initiatives, had elements of rational discourse as well as appeals to emotion.
Thus, the inclusion of sunset provisions in the Patriot Act was a thoughtful,
deliberative response to the legislators' insight that the bill was being ush-
ered through in the heat of emotion to address a vivid, immediate crisis.
Whatever its limitations, the point here is not to criticize the Act, nor legis-
lators for reacting emotionally. Rather, it is to show that immediate re-
92. EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL 57 (James T. Boulton ed., rev. ed., Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1987) (1958).
93. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
94. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism, Nationalism and the War on Terror: A Mild
Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REv. 933, 948 (2004).
95. The USA PATRIOT Act is 131 pages long.
96. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Terrorism Bill's Sparse Paper Trail May Cause Legal Vulnerabili-
ties, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY, 2533, 2534 (2001) (reporting that many of the lawmakers who voted for the
USA PATRIOT Act never had a chance to read to the final version before the bill was passed); cf 147
CONG. REC. S10,991 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("We expedited the legislative process in the
Judiciary Committee to consider the [Bush] Administration's proposals. In daily news conferences prior
to the original passage of the USA [PATRIOT] Act, the Attorney General [John Ashcroft] referred to
the need for such prompt consideration.").
97. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 94, at 948; Administration 's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001:
Hearing Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
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sponses to emotional crises are often not adequately informed by delibera-
tive decision making.
Similarly, executive decisions to use force to retaliate against terrorist
attacks over the past two decades have been made in the heat of the mo-
ment and appear to reflect an emotional hostility rather than a deliberative
judgment as to the best long-term strategy for dealing with terrorism. The
Reagan Administration's 1986 retaliatory strike against Libya and the Clin-
ton Administration's 1998 strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan after the
embassy bombings each occurred within weeks or days of United States
identification of the perpetrator. As a former Middle East terrorism analyst
for the U.S. Defense Department has noted:
With emotions still raw, U.S. officials may have opted for the tool of
hostility that reflected their current mindset; in contrast, if the perpetra-
tors of the attacks were not identified until years or months later, it is
possible that U.S. decision makers, removed from the anger of the mo-
ment, might have selected less aggressive measures to achieve account-
ability and bring the terrorists to justice. 98
Or as former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft expressed it, "you
have to strike when the situation is hot." 99
The need to act quickly to respond to terrorist threats, even in the ab-
sence of factual clarity, has been defended by various administrations.
President Reagan's Secretary of State George Schultz argued in 1984 that
the United States must be ready to use military force to fight terrorism and
retaliate for terrorist attacks even before all the facts are known.100 Simi-
larly, former legal advisor Abraham Sofaer claimed that in the interest of
national security, the United States must use force when responding to
terrorism, even if our claims cannot "be proved in a real court or in the
court of public opinion."10l Although the United Nations Charter attempts
to limit the unilateral use of military power to cases of clear self-defense,
Schultz argued that "we do not have the luxury of waiting until all the am-
biguities have disappeared."'
02
98. Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 23 (2002); see also Michele L. Malvesti,
Explaining the United States Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists, 13 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE
85, 94, 96 (2001) (explaining government decisions to order retaliatory air strikes in the "heat of the
moment").
99. John Lancaster, Compromising Positions, WASH. POST MAG., July 9, 2000, at 22 (quoting
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President George Bush, Sr.).
100. See Excerpts from Shultz's Address on International Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1984, at
A12.
101. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 101
(1989).
102. George Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 25 I.L.M. 204, 205
(1986).
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Moreover, the short-term satisfaction of retaliatory military action
against terrorists often is outweighed by the long-term consequences. The
1986 air strikes against Libya underscore the dangers of military retaliation.
Although many observers claim that Libyan-sponsored terrorism declined
after the United States' raid of Tripoli, our government concluded other-
wise. United States officials have determined that the 1988 destruction of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, was Libya's response to the
Tripoli raid, and that, in the words of a former counterterrorism official,
"we [had] just set up the next round of terrorism."' 03 Thus, after the Lock-
erbie tragedy, the United States government shifted its strategy and focused
on diplomacy and law enforcement. That effort took much longer but even-
tually resulted in Libya turning over its agents involved in the bombing for
prosecution. As former CIA Director James Woolsey has stated, an effec-
tive response to terrorism is often "at odds with its being prompt."'1 0
4
Most ominously, the war against terror has led to a distortion of the
temporal component of decision making, so that potential threats that ordi-
narily and historically were treated as allowing time for negotiation, delib-
eration, and defensive preparation are now perceived as if they are
imminent and require immediate action.
For example, historically, international law did not permit a nation to
use force against another unless it was being attacked or was in imminent
danger of attack by the other. 105 The concept of anticipatory self-defense
was thus tethered to the existence of an imminent threat. In a direct chal-
lenge to international law, the Bush Administration's National Security
Strategy adopted a policy of preemptive military action in response to
emerging or potential threats that does not meet the old standard of immi-
nence. 106 The new policy requires that "we must adapt the concept of im-
minent threat" to meet the greater threat posed by terrorists. 10 7 Although
103. Andrew Marshall, Strike First, Ask Questions Later; US. Policy Is Now to Hit Terrorists
Hard, Without Any Legal Niceties, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 30, 1998, at 13; see also Richard J.
Newman et al., America Fights Back: Clinton Raises the Stakes in the War Against Terrorism, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 31, 1998, at 38-39 ("The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 is widely
believed to have been an act of revenge for the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 .... ).
104. Counterterrorism Policy Before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of James Woolsey, Director, CIA), available at 1998 WL 564420.
105. The traditional formulation of the historic tenet of international law is contained in a letter by
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in response to the Caroline incident: "It will be for that Government
to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." Daniel Webster, A Letter to Henry Fox, in I BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT (PART 1, SERIES C)
153, 159 (Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt eds., 1986).




the administration claimed that "we will always proceed deliberately,"
expanding the notion of imminence will inevitably strengthen the hand of
emote control, encouraging the use of force where traditional international
law might have favored other approaches. Despite the National Security
Strategy's promise to weigh the consequences of using force, rendering the
decision time sensitive will inevitably distort that weighing process. The
War on Terrorism's recreation and escalation of the Cold War's permanent
and pervasive sense of crisis and emergency thus threatens to overwhelm
such international legal categories as defensive/offensive actions or immi-
nent/future threat, which are designed to promote reasoned, deliberative
decision making.
The Bush Administration's first test of its new preemptive strategy in
Iraq highlights its dangers. The administration's preemptory dismissal of
the factual investigation of the team of United Nations inspections in favor
of its own speculative and ultimately erroneous convictions that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction, combined with its clear failure to adequately
consider the actual risks attendant to invading Iraq, underlines the risk of
action that is not informed by calculated deliberation.
IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS
As first noted in Part I, emote control leads to a substitution of symbol
for substance at two levels. First, people tend to respond more strongly to
symbols than to the substance of issues. Specifically, emote control typi-
cally produces an overreaction to certain types of problems-chiefly those
that affect people closely associated with us, that are proximate in time and
space, that are recent and perceived of as new (i.e., prior to adaptation), and
that are vividly described and easy to visualize. By the same token, it can
produce under-reaction to problems characterized by the opposite end of
the continuum for each of these attributes. Second, people will tend to sup-
port and advocate for symbolic "feel good" responses to problems rather
than substantive long-term solutions. Both of these patterns can be seen not
only in foreign policy, but also in almost every area of politics and law.
Environmental law andpolicy: In the area of environmental law and
regulation, for example, people's sympathetic reactions have little to do
with the actual urgency of problems. As many commentators have noted,
people tend to respond powerfully to the plight of large, cute animals-
"charismatic megafauna"-that are easy to visualize and to anthropomor-
phize. For example, the media costs for covering three whales trapped on
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polar ice in the winter of 1988 exceeded six million dollars. 108 The whales
were given names, and there was widespread rejoicing when Siku and
Poutu swam to apparent freedom and grief when baby Bone sank beneath
the chilly waters and died. The ridiculousness of the attention and support
these whales received, while perhaps manifest on the face of it, is only
highlighted by the observation that, during the same period, many more
whales were being hunted around the globe and were dying from all sorts
of human-made causes, including the collapse of worldwide fisheries,
which received nowhere near the same degree of attention.
Visual imagery plays an important, albeit not necessarily rational, role
in shaping policy with regard to endangered species. In the 1970s, a multi-
million-dollar media campaign in the United States showed hunters in
Newfoundland clubbing newborn baby harp seals to death in the yearly
cull. Baby seals were being cruelly sacrificed to satisfy a voracious and
frivolous demand for fur coats. Harp seals were identified as an endangered
species; clubbing was denounced as cruel; seal coats disappeared from the
fashion runways and the streets, and public outcry was such that the United
States Congress urged Canada to reassess its policy of permitting the
slaughter of baby seals. Public attention ultimately shifted to other causes;
pictures of bloody baby seals disappeared from the newspapers and televi-
sions of Americans. As the attention of the media shifted, scientists felt
comfortable asserting that harp seals are not endangered (on the contrary,
without the yearly cull, overpopulation would be a problem) and the yearly
seal cull continues in Newfoundland, out of the public spotlight. 109
Arbitrary categories are also important when it comes to environ-
mental attitudes. Deer (evoking memories of Bambi) fall into the category
of "good" animals for many Americans. Deer are not an endangered spe-
cies. In the northeastern United States, a mushrooming deer population not
only poses dangers for motorists and a nuisance for gardeners, it also places
an unsustainable pressure on the ecosystem-a pressure that ultimately
translates into deer starving to death, or seriously weakened, succumbing to
disease. Nonetheless, efforts to manage the deer population in the north-
eastern United States regularly and predictably stimulate controversy and
intense opposition."l 0 By contrast, wolves and grizzly bears, both species
108. Captain Paul Watson, Free Keiko, Free Lolita, Free Corky, OCEAN REALM, Summer 1999,
available at http://www.seashepherd.org/essays/ocean_realm_sum99.html.
109. Bryce Muir, In Defense of Canadian Seal Hunting, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1977, at 20.
110. David Kocieniewski, Audubon Group Advocates Deer Hunting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at
4; Letters to the Editor: Who's Afraid of a Few White-Tailed Deer?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 10.
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that truly were endangered, elicited considerably less support and more
ambiguity. I
Adaptation and temporal proximity also play an important role in
shaping environmental policy. The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince Wil-
liam Sound in 1989 was one of the worst environmental disasters in
American history, inciting a nationwide public protest, a massive volunteer
effort to assist in clean up, and the passage of the Oil Pollution Act in Au-
gust of 1990. 112 Responses to subsequent massive oil spills, such as that
caused by the grounding of the New Carissa in Coos Bay off the coast of
Oregon, 113 have been much more subdued and localized. The first disaster
sparked widespread and vociferous response, coupled with a demand for
legislation. Later disasters barely made the national news. Moreover, the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 offers a prime example of symbol over sub-
stance. The act itself focuses on establishing responsibility for spills and
defining (large) fines; substantive preventive measures are vague at best.' 14
Indeed, a decade after the debacle, Exxon had yet to pay the punitive dam-
ages determined in the case and was challenging the provision of the 1990
law that forbade the specific tanker involved in the spill from ever return-
ing to Alaska-a provision of the law that in itself is certainly symbolic
rather than substantive. 115 And finally, adaptation and a lack of temporal
proximity undoubtedly play a role in the lack of world (and especially
United States) mobilization to deal with the problem of global warming,
which is arguably the greatest single threat to humanity (as well as other
species). Unlike whales trapped in the ice, global warming is a slowly de-
veloping problem with few if any immediately identifiable victims. 1'
6
111. Kirk Johnson, Wolf's Future in Wyoming, as Predator of Fragile Species, Is in Court's Hands,
N.Y TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at A9; Andrew C. Revkin, Rules on Gray Wolf May Soon Ease, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2000, at A10; Associated Press, Northwest. Oregon: A Reprieve For Wolves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 2005, at A15.
112. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484-
113. McGraw Hill Higher Education, Environmental Global Issues Map: New Carissa Oil Spill on
the Oregon Coast (Mar. 1999), at http://www.mhhe.combiosci/pae/esmap/articles/article_29.mhtml.
This oil spill never made the front page of the New York Times; only a few brief articles addressed it.
The issue was finally put to bed as a "troublesome freighter." See also the grounding of the tanker
Jessica that endangered the Galapagos Islands in 2001. Charles Darwin Foundation, Inc., What's New:
Galapagos National Park Press Release Galapagos Oil Spill (Jan. 17, 2001), at
http://www.galapagos-org/whatsnew/oilspill.html; Eli Sanders, Alaska Oil Spill Takes Toll On Animals
and Fisheries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at 21.
114. 33 U.SC. § 2702 et seq. (2000). See http://www-epa.gov/oilspill/opakeys.htm for the provi-
sions of the act.
115. Sam Howe Verhovek, Across 10 Years, Exxon Valdez Casts a Shadow, N-Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1999, at Al.
116. See generally Nuclear Power: An exchange, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 15, 2001, at 63 (discuss-
ing that the specter of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island is probably distorting U.S. energy policy in a
fashion that promotes not only global warming but also war. Nuclear power produces 19% of our
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Drugpolicy: Emote control can also be seen in policies and legislation
involving drugs. In 1973 the New York State legislature, under pressure
from then Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, passed a set of draconian
antidrug laws, including mandatory prison sentences for the possession and
sale of drugs. Prison populations and the proportion of state funding spent
on prisons skyrocketed. In 1977, a committee assessed results and con-
cluded that the laws were a dismal failure. Nonetheless, in 1986 in the con-
text of election campaigning and growing public concern over drugs,
particularly crack cocaine, and drug-related crimes, Congress adopted simi-
lar harsh antidrug measures, including mandatory minimum sentences and
prescribing the death penalty for some cases. During the height of the drug
wars, penalties for drug-related crimes, and especially those involving
crack cocaine, were escalated up to the point where they were completely
out of proportion to other types of offenses--e.g., 100 times as severe for
crack cocaine as for powdered cocaine. The prisons rapidly filled and then
expanded, bursting with prisoners who posed very little objective risk to
society. The enactment of mandatory minimum sentencing for drug users
caused the Federal Bureau of Prisons budget to increase by more than
1,350%, from $220 million in 1986 to about $3.19 billion in 1997.117 Fifty-
five percent of all federal drug defendants are low-level offenders, such as
"mules" or street dealers. Only 11% are classified as high-level dealers,
and, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, only 5.5% of federal
crack defendants are considered high-level crack dealers. 118 In one not
unrepresentative case, a twenty-four-year-old first-time offender received a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifty-five years because he carried a
handgun to two $250 marijuana deals. The judge in the case called on
President Bush to commute the sentence "to something that is more in ac-
cord with just and rational punishment," recommending a sentence of "no
more than 18 years in prison, the average sentence that the jurors in this
case recommended." ' 1 9 The plea fell on deaf ears.
electricity with no release of atmospheric pollution or carbon dioxide, and no fatalities, to date, in the
United States or Western Europe. Meanwhile, wars fought over oil have killed hundreds of thousands.).
117. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA 1975 THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S 2003 REQUEST TO
THE CONGRESS 110-11 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/budgetsummary/btd!-
1975 200212002/html/page1O9-112.htm; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 1997: FY 1998 BUDGET SUMMARY
(Feb. 1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/htm/bop.htm.
118. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY tbl. 18, at 170 (Feb. 1995).
119. Laurie P. Cohen, Judge Criticizes Sentencing Law After Setting a 55-Year Term, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 2004, at A5.
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Decades after the implementation of these draconian drug laws, with
terrorism foremost on the minds of the public, there was barely any men-
tion of the drug problem in the most recent presidential race. The large
numbers of people who remain incarcerated for crimes that society no
longer seemed particularly concerned about were out of sight and hence
largely out of mind-the flip side of emote control.
Racial discrimination: In December 2002, then Senate Republican
leader Trent Lott made the mistake of remarking that the country would not
have had all "these problems" over all these years had Strom Thurmond
been elected president in 1948. Lott's implicit endorsement of Thurmond's
racist policies (Thurmond had run as a Dixiecrat, openly segregationist)
unleashed a torrent of protest, and, despite Lott's repeated apologies, he
was forced to resign as the Senate Republican leader. 120 Lott's comments
had made him a symbol of our nation's history of racial problems.
But, in substance, his resignation as Republican leader changed noth-
ing. Senator Bill Frist replaced Lott as Senate Republican leader, and, al-
though Frist's public persona was considerably more appealing than Lott's,
his voting record on issues concerning civil rights and racial minorities was
virtually identical to his predecessor. 121
The elevation of symbol over substance can be seen not only in the
Lott affair, but also in the American legal system's response to overcoming
and eradicating racism. Professor Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw has written
that prior to the civil rights reform of the 1950s and 60s, blacks experi-
enced two forms of oppression, "symbolic and material. ' 122 To her, sym-
bolic segregation referred to the formal denial of social and political equity
to all blacks, regardless of their accomplishments. Material subordination
defined the broader structural, sociological, economic, and psychological
discrimination that limited the life choices of blacks within all spheres of
120. Nick Anderson, Lott Resigns His Post as Senate GOP Leader, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at
1.
121. See Jim Lobe, Politics-U.S., Resignation, Race and the Republicans, INTER PRESS SERVICE
NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 23, 2002, available at http:/idomino.ips.org/ips/eng.NSF/vwWEB-
Main-
View?SearchVicw&Query=%28jim+lobe%29++and+Y%2E2002x+and+M%2E 12x+and+D%2E23x&
SearchMax=100&SearchOrder-3; A Sorry Lott, NATION, Jan. 13, 2003, at 3 (discussing Trent Lott and
the Republican record on race relations by noting that the NAACP, National Hispanic Leadership
Agenda, and people for the American Way gave Frist an almost identical rating on civil rights as Lott);
James Ridgeway, Mondo Washington, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan- 14, 2003, at 31 (citing Kim Gandy, Presi-
dent of National Organization for Women, who said, "[flew senators have worse voting record on civil
rights than Trent Lott, but Bill Frist is one of them"); Hardball (MSNBC television broadcast Jan. 9,
2003) (Conservative Senator Rick Santorum said that Frist "has pointed out to me on many occasions,
that his voting record is more conservative than mine.").
122. Kimbcr6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988).
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American society. Although the legal system has been able to a significant
degree to remove most formal barriers and symbolic manifestations of ra-
cism-not an insubstantial feat-the legal response to segregation has not
fundamentally affected the disparate material conditions between the races
and in important respects legitimates and perpetuates the substantial dis-
parities that continue to persist.
The legal mechanisms that the Supreme Court has utilized to both out-
law de jure, formal, and "symbolic" racial discrimination yet at the same
time perpetuate structural social and economic substantive inequality dem-
onstrates the tension between emotional and rational reactions in a field
that usually prides itself as the paragon of rational decision making. The
two main legal mechanisms that the Court has used in recent years to insu-
late substantive disparities is the intent doctrine and the doctrine of race
neutrality that strictly scrutinizes any racial classification, including those
affording affirmative action for blacks and other minority groups. The in-
tent doctrine requires that racial discrimination claims brought pursuant to
the equal protection clause of the Constitution must prove that the dis-
crimination was intentionally caused and not simply the effect of govern-
ment policies. 123 The Court has offered a number of rational reasons for its
focus on intent and not effect. For example, the Court has argued that a test
that did not focus on a state actor's intent, but rather on the effect of a gov-
ernmental action that burdens one race substantially more than another,
could invalidate a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, or criminal
statutes and would thus cause too dramatic a change in our legal land-
scape. 124 An alternative account, however, suggested by our discussion in
this Article, is that these judicial decisions are consistent with and may be
influenced by emotional reactions to race and racism rather than more ra-
tional deliberations about how to best address the substantive problem of
racial disparities.
For example, the Court's focus on an invidious intentional perpetrator
of discrimination and not on evidence of statistical discrimination is consis-
tent with the social science research that people react more strongly to spe-
cific instances than to abstractions. Although in the race cases the victim is
always specific, the intent doctrine focuses the Court's decision on an iden-
tifiable bad actor, as opposed to a statistical abstraction. For example, in
McCleskey v. Kemp, a black man facing the death penalty argued that his
sentence violated the equal protection clause because statistics showed that
murderers who killed whites were fare more likely to receive the death
123. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
124. See, e.g., id; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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penalty than similarly situated murderers whose victims happened to be
black.125 The Court rejected McCleskey's claim in large part because he
could not prove that the prosecutors and jury in his case acted with a dis-
criminatory motive. 126 Although the Court assumed that the statistical
study that McCleskey had introduced was valid and that it demonstrated
that a statistical risk of racial bias entered into capital sentencing decisions
in Georgia, McCleskey would have to demonstrate that the decision in his
case was specifically influenced by race. This he could not show. 127 In-
deed, the Court cited McCleskey's expert (who conducted the study) who
testified that "[m]odels that are developed talk about the effect on the aver-
age. They do not depict the experience of a single individual." 28
As Justice Brennan observed in dissent, the majority decision that
McCleskey must demonstrate that race affected the particular decision
making in his case is erroneous in that the usual standard is whether the
death penalty was "imposed under [circumstances] that create an substan-
tial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner." 129 But, of course foreseeing of risk does require a focus on statis-
tics and the system as a whole. The Court's focus on imposing liability
only where there is a concrete victim and concrete perpetrator who can be
clearly identified is consistent with a societal reluctance to take action to
counter discrimination unless there is a strong emotional, and not just ra-
tional, impetus for such action.
The substitution of symbol for substance when it comes to race is not
only evident in law but can be seen in a wide range of affirmative action
policies. These tend to focus on late-stage solutions, such as increasing
admittance to universities and professional schools rather than attempting
to increase equality of opportunity at earlier stages of education where it
would be most likely to make a difference. Local financing of school dis-
tricts, which naturally leads to the lowest level of spending on education for
those who are already at greatest disadvantage, is the most obvious mani-
festation of an overall policy that emphasizes symbol over substance-
indeed that, at a substantive level, actually exacerbates the problem.
125. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 290.
126. Id. at 292-93.
127. See id. at 290 n.7.
128. Seeid.at290n.11.
129. Id. at 322-23.
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V. POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Acting on passions is often a good thing. At the individual level, pas-
sions provide many of life's greatest sources of pleasure. To ignore their
call would lead to an unfulfilling life. At the national level, passions can
result in mass mobilization for desirable ends, such as defeating Nazism,
sending a man to the moon, or helping victims of natural disasters such as
the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Ironically, therefore, the same fick-
leness of public attention can have implications that are quite the opposite
of those that apply to war. Whereas in the case of war one often needs to
put the brakes on public passions, in cases where society faces real sus-
tained challenges but people's attention spans are short, one has to be ready
to act on short notice and in dramatic ways.
Global warming provides a perfect illustration. Environmental im-
provement takes sustained efforts and often requires long-term sacrifices,
but public attention to environmental issues is often short-lived, responding
to dramatic events and then dissipating. For -example, the city of Donora,
Pennsylvania, endured half a century of ever-worsening pollution that
threatened the health of its occupants, culminating in a "killer smog" that
sent occupants indoors and killed a large number of people in the space of a
few days. 130 The Donora "killer smog" incident directly resulted in the
Pennsylvania Clean Air Act in 1955 and was cited in the congressional
debates of the federal Clean Air Act in 1970.131 Given fickle public con-
cern about long-term problems and the tendency to adapt to even the worst
conditions, policymakers may need to be ready to act quickly when such
windows of opportunity present themselves. As Anthony Downs writes:
Ironically, the cause of ecologists would therefore benefit from an envi-
ronmental disaster like a "killer smog" that would choke thousands to
death in a few days.... Yet even the most powerful symbols lose their
impact if they are constantly repeated. The piteous sight of an oil-soaked
seagull or a dead soldier pales after it has been viewed even a dozen
times. 13 2
The short-lived nature of emotional reactions is exacerbated by the fact that
the very problems that people react to may be the ones that are the most
visible rather than the most serious. As Downs continues, "[m]oreover,
some of the worst environmental threats come from forms of pollution that
are invisible. Thus, our propensity to focus attention on what is most visi-
130. David Templeton, Donora 's Doomsday Message, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 29, 1998,
at Fl.
131. Id.




ble may cause us to clean up the pollution we can easily perceive while
ignoring more dangerous but hidden threats."1
33
Yet the very same emotional response that can lead to effective action
on environmental problems when harnessed by savvy policymakers may
also result in a rush to war or a counterterrorism response that discards civil
liberties. Just as acting on one's passions at the individual level can lead to
the "morning after" syndrome where one wonders who that crazy person
was the previous night who did all those stupid things, emote control can
produce "hangovers" at the national level. 134 The internment of Japanese
after Pearl Harbor, McCarthyism, the Vietnam war-in fact, many of our
nation's biggest mistakes-have been actions taken under the thrall of
powerful emotions such as fear and rage. World War I is a salient example
for Europeans.
Emote control is a critical component of human decision making and
cannot simply be banished. But is there any way to selectively avoid those
actions that are likely to lead to regrets? Are there legal and policy mecha-
nisms that are helpful in reducing some of the problematic features of
emote control?
This Article suggests three basic policy proposals. The first is that
courts and policymakers use caution in evaluating arguments premised
upon vivid, dramatic, and potentially devastating future risks with the un-
derstanding that it is exactly such vivid, nightmarish scenarios that are
likely to evoke emotional responses that will distort deliberative analysis. It
is therefore precisely in response to terrifying scenarios that the greatest
need exists for courts and policymakers to engage in a careful review of the
facts and weighing of alternative options.
For example, a recent New York Times editorial argues that:
The post-9/11 world involves two competing nightmares. One imagines
another terrorist attack that occurs because authorities fail to respond to
signs of danger. The other is about innocent people who are arrested by
mistake and held indefinitely because authorities are too frightened, or
embarrassed, to admit their errors. We have to be equally vigilant against
both.135
Yet we know that there is both historical and psychological evidence
that people are not equally vigilant about both risks of error, particularly
133. id. at 47.
134. For a seminal early discussion of this point, see Irving Janis' Victims of Groupthink, which
identifies a phenomenon that Janis calls "hypervigilance" that is closely related to what we have been
calling emote control. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972).
135. Editorial, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A20-
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when the doomsday attack has very vivid imagery associated with it and
the risk of detaining innocent people is directed mainly towards aliens who
evoke little emotional sympathy.
136
In academic and policymaking circles, the potentially destructive
nightmare scenario set against the backdrop of September 11 has been in-
voked to suggest discarding or modifying the traditional rules regarding
attacking other nations, prosecuting and detaining suspected terrorists, the
treatment of prisoners, and the torturing of suspected terrorists. In each of
these areas, the magnitude and unpredictability of the threat has led many
to conclude that the traditional deliberation and careful fact-finding rules
need rethinking. Professor Ruth Wedgwood articulates a broadly held view
that:
We tolerate multiple acts of individual and social violence as the cost of
safeguarding our privacy and liberty, demanding that the government
meet an extraordinary standard of proof before it can claim any power
over our person, acting with retrospective rather than anticipatory glance.
But now the stakes seem different. We are not accustomed to losing
thousands of lives in the blink of an eye and the view of a camera. We
are not used to the malevolent leverage that lets a handful of men multi-
ply their destructive power through the ordinary instruments of transport
and commerce. The deliberate temperance and incompleteness of crimi-
nal law enforcement seem inadequate to the emergency, when the threat
to innocent life has multiplied by orders of magnitude. 
137
Wedgwood's conclusion makes a certain intuitive sense. Yet, her ar-
gument could be turned on its head. It could be argued that it is precisely
when society confronts such a "threat to innocent life.., multiplied by
orders of magnitude" that careful deliberation-which is widely agreed to
be the most effective mode of problem solving-is most important. And,
hence, it is all the more tragic that it is in exactly such situations that emote
control of decision making is likely to be most pervasive. Therefore our
first broad policy conclusion is that, contrary to the intuitive perspective
reached by many academics and policymakers, careful deliberative process
is most important in deciding to go to war or responding to international
threats precisely at those times when it is most likely to be discarded. We
should therefore be very cautious about accepting arguments that call for
short-circuiting ordinary processes of decision making in these circum-
136. COLE, supra note 49.




stances because those arguments usually ignore or downplay the height-
ened role of passions in decision making.
138
Our second conclusion is that legal process solutions must recognize
and counteract the role of emote control to be effective. Legal process is a
preferred method of both lawyers and policymakers to introduce rational
decision making into areas in which we know that passions have a major
influence. Thus the Constitution's Framers sought to reduce the rule of
passions in the decision to go to war by providing that only Congress could
initiate war. Yet the history of war making over the past half century illus-
trates the difficulty of imposing legal process on decisions so laden with
immediate, emotional inputs. It suggests that the legal process school's
ambitious effort to resolve conflict through rational process may be flawed.
Legal process must be keyed more precisely to overcome the emotional
reactions that distort that process.
Legal process has figured prominently in some legal scholars' attempt
to mediate the tension between the government's need to forestall a future
terrorist disaster and the protection of civil liberties. For example, Professor
Alan Dershowitz has suggested that we permit the executive to torture ter-
rorism suspects who may have information that could prevent a future ter-
rorist attack, but only after following legal process and requiring the
government to obtain a "torture warrant" from a judge. 139 Viewed from the
perspective of the psychological framework presented in this Article, such
a proposal is hopelessly flawed: if the government informs a judge that
unless he or she issues such a warrant without delay, a terrorist attack may
not be averted, most courts would feel tremendous pressure to grant the
warrant. Given the evidence that we tend to undervalue future conse-
quences in comparison to immediate, vivid consequences, the longer-term
costs for the rule of law of granting such a warrant will be overly dis-
counted. As one commentator has noted, "the intangible and abstract nature
138. At the height of the stock market frenzy of the late 1990s. many commentators argued that
new developments such as the internet had created a "new era" in which the old rules of market valua-
tion no longer applied. In an article in Money magazine in 1999, reporter Jason Zweig confronted this
question. He asked "It seems to me there are only two possibilities: This really is a 'new era,' in which
the price of a stock will never again matter and value funds will never recover. Or it's not a new era
after all, in which case value funds will eventually come back and overpriced stocks will be revealed for
the risky gambles they really are." Zweig then "cornered David Dreman [an investment fund manager]
on this point," who responded: "[olkay, the probability that this really is a new era is not zero.... But I
would say that it's about as probable as my jumping out of an airplane at 20,000 feet without a para-
chute and surviving." Jason Zweig, Don't Sell Value Short, MONEY, June 1999, at 92.
139. ALAN M. DERSHOWsTZ, WHY TERRoIosM WORKS 141, 158-63 (2002).
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of such future costs, in comparison with the very tangible pending catastro-
phe, exacerbates this defect in our risk assessment."
140
Moreover, judges are subject to the same passions of nationalism and
fear that affect other policymakers; the history of judges overruling emer-
gency requests from the executive is sparse. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
noted that the Supreme Court has almost always upheld executive actions
of dubious constitutionality during wartime. Only after the war is over and
the passions of nationalist fervor have cooled have the courts played an
independent role. 14 1 The recent case of the special Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") courts established to approve orders authorizing
the United States government's electronic surveillance of an "agent of a
foreign power" provides support for skepticism about the potential for
courts to act as a brake on the passions. In its twenty-five-year history, the
Court has rejected a government application for a special electronic surveil-
lance order only once, 142 and that one case was promptly overturned by a
special appeals court.
143
In recognition that the normal legal process/separation of powers reli-
ance on either judicial decision making or legislative process is flawed in
time of emergency, another prominent legal scholar, Bruce Ackerman, has
relied on the notion of supermajority approval of emergency actions. Ac-
kerman's proposal is to allow the declaration of a state emergency provid-
ing the executive with extraordinary emergency powers, but introducing a
political check-the "supermajoritarian escalator"-designed to preclude
"permanent" emergencies. 144 Ackerman's proposal would permit the emer-
gency to continue for two to three months upon a majority vote of Con-
gress. Thereafter, however, an escalating supermajority would be required
to continue the emergency: a 60% vote of Congress to extend the emer-
gency two more months, a 70% vote required for the next two months, and
an 80% vote thereafter. 145
140. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedi-
ence, 88 MrNN. L. REV. 1481, 1500 (2004).
141. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 225 (1998). The Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004),
could be viewed as exceptions to that general proposition, but undoubtedly those decisions stem from
the vague and permanent nature of the war on terrorism. Had those cases come to the Court in the
immediate aftermath of September 11, the decisions may well have been different.
142. David Hardin, The Fuss over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA PATRIOT
Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 314 (2003).
143. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
144. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
145. Id. at 1047-49.
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Ackerman's solution was inspired by the South Africa Constitution,
and some other constitutions, which also impose supermajoritarian rules for
the authorization of emergencies. 146 Constitutional supermajority provi-
sions do have a function of checking the emotional passions that might
override reasoned judgment, because presumably those passions would be
less likely to affect the supermajority than a mere majority. 147 Neverthe-
less, while a supermajority is less likely than a simple majority to yield to
irrational impulses, it is not immune from such temptations. "Hence, a con-
stitutional requirement of a qualified majority does not by itself provide
much of a protection against the people's propensity to collective weakness
of will."1 48 Moreover, as Professor David Cole has noted, Ackerman's
broad process approach fails to grapple with the difficult substantive ques-
tion of what emergency powers the government should be permitted to
exercise for the duration of the emergency. 149 Ackerman's proposal, at
best, only limits an emergency's duration.
For process to work, it requires a mechanism that might counteract the
nationalistic emotions that color deliberative discourse. For decisions to go
to war, a Madisonian process solution does suggest itself from both scien-
tific and historical experience. Throughout the Federalist Papers, and par-
ticularly in Federalist No. 10, Madison views the greatest danger to
democratic governments as the problem of a "faction ... who are united
and actuated by some common impulse ofpassion."1
50
146. Oren Gross, Providing for the Unexpected: Constitutional Emergency Provisions, 33 lsr. YB
HUM, RTS. 13, 31 n.95 (2004) (citing provision in constitutions of Greece, Germany, South Africa, and
India).
147. See John Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)_ A key feature of constitutions, according to Elster is
their resistance to the emotions of the moment. Most constitutions require supermajorities to change,
and in federal systems a qualified majority of states often have to give consent. Perhaps even more
importantly, constitutions impose delays that prevent changes from being made on short notice. In some
cases, successive parliaments have to rule in favor of the change, and in others, there is a time delay
between when change can be proposed and when it is actually voted on. As Elster writes:
In the heat of passion or under the influence of some immediate temptation, an individual can
deviate from prudent plans formed in advance or do things that he will later regret. Groups of
individuals, such as voters or members of a political assembly, are no less prone to such irra-
tional behavior. Sometimes, aggregate irrationality is simply the sum of irrational individual
responses to the same external situation; at other times, passionate factions may form by in-
teraction effects and crowd psychology. Whatever their origin, collective fits of passion can
be extremely destructive in their effects. Inflamed majorities have violated the rights of mi-
norities, spent money they did not have, and declared war for no good reason,
Id. at 39-40. Time delays, according to this argument, provide a kind of "cooling-off period" such that
long-term changes to the system will not be effectuated in the heat of the moment.
148. Id. at 40.
149. David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE
LJ. 1753, 1756 (2004).
150. FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
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A Madisonian cure to the problem of passions controlling decisions is
to "[e]xtend the sphere" in which a decision is to be made, to include a
"greater variety of parties and interests [that] make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens. ' 15 1 "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame
within their particular states but will be unable to spread a general confla-
gration through the other states.
'152
The Madisonian solution is available and already functioning to ad-
dress decisions to go to war. The United Nations Security Council "extends
the sphere" of decision making, providing some check against passions
such as nationalism and fear that feed the impulse to go to war and to
which American legislators and judges are not immune. Other nations are
less likely to share those passions. Therefore the U.N. Charter's require-
ment that the Security Council approve all uses of force except those that
are taken in response to an armed attack could be an effective check against
impulsive, emotional decision making.
One argument against the Security Council process is that the U.N.
Charter permits any of the five permanent members of the Council (United
States, Britain, France, Russia, China) to veto a decision to use force, and
that therefore U.S. interests could be blocked by any one nation. Whatever
the validity of the critique, it does not apply where a substantial bloc of
countries on the Security Council oppose the use of force. For example,
before the recent Iraq invasion, it was clear that a majority of the perma-
nent Security Council members (France, China, and Russia) opposed the
United States and British request for authorization of force against Iraq.
Moreover, the U.S./British proposal would not have received even the re-
quired majority of the entire Council of fifteen member states. In that situa-
tion, both the U.N. Charter and the theory proposed here counsel against
going to war.
Finally, process is not enough; making deliberative decisions requires
the weighing of substantive values. 153 The dynamics of emote control skew
those substantive value choices, particularly in situations when passions
run high. In the international arena there exist a set of well-established legal
and moral rules and principles that reflect decades if not centuries of hu-
man experience as guideposts to decision making. Such moral and legal
principles as Just War Theory developed in the middle ages by theologians,
and the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Convention, and the Conven-
151. Id. at 78.
152. Id. at 79.
153. Cole, supra note 149, at 1757-58.
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tion Against Torture ought to provide, at minimum, warning signs to the
population and government officials to determine if their decision making
is being skewed by emotional factors.' 54 Just as Alcoholics Anonymous
has a check list of questions designed to determine if a person's drinking is
so impulsive as to require intervention, so, too, international law has a se-
ries of questions that, at minimum, should raise a warning flag that impulse
and not reason is behind a decision to go to war. Those questions are (a) is
the planned use of force in response to an attack or imminent attack by
another nation; (b) has the international organization or at least the critical
regional organizations approved the use of force; and (c) have all alterna-
tive mechanisms for resolving the conflict been exhausted. Policymakers
should take these questions seriously, and where, as in the recent case of
the invasion of Iraq the answers to these questions are negative, govern-
ment officials should reconsider their decision to use force. This policy
recommendation would require a clear shift in both public and governmen-
tal thinking, as the war in Iraq illustrates. In the run-up to that war, there
appears to have been almost no discussion of international legal principles
by policymakers, the media, or society in general.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this Article has been threefold. First, we challenge the
fundamental assumptions of economics and law that decision making is
solely the product of rational, deliberate processes that entail a careful
weighing of costs and benefits. Rather we start from the premise that deci-
sion making represents the interaction of two qualitatively different neural
processes--emote control and deliberation-that often clash, producing
results at odds with those predicted by traditional economic or legal mod-
els. This Article represents a first, and hence necessarily speculative and
tentative, attempt to apply what is known about the interaction of affect and
deliberation in human behavior to the analysis of foreign policy, terrorism,
and international law. We hope that this is not the final word on the topic,
but that these ideas will stimulate further academic research on, and discus-
sion of, the role of affect in these important areas of national life.
Affect transforms people in fundamental ways. The same person in
different affective states is, it could be argued, more different when it
comes to attitudes and behavior than different people who are in neutral
154. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or




states. Because society is composed of individuals who are subject to affec-
tive influences, and because societal-level events often trigger similar af-
fective reactions in many people, societies can similarly be transformed by
collective affective states. Depending on the nature of these affective states,
they can produce extremes of behavior, from outpourings of sympathy to
remarkable indifference in the face of widespread misery to extremes of
aggression coupled with lack of concern about personal risk. Thus, citizens
should be afraid to begin wars, but national pride, fear, or even the passion
of abstract principles can put people into a bellicose state of mind that ren-
ders them insensitive to the risk of death or injury.
The second major theme of this Article is that a major function of law
should be to augment deliberative control of behavior in exactly the types
of situations-those characterized by intense affect-when it is most
needed but least likely to exert an influence. Yet it is precisely in those
situations of perceived crisis that many legal scholars and courts urge the
abandonment of those legal processes designed to promote deliberative
judgment. These courts and legal thinkers emphasize the need for speed
and decisiveness in times of perceived crisis but ignore the increased dan-
ger of decision making based on short-term passions and not careful con-
sideration of consequences.
A perception or modification of crisis thus can lead to an abandon-
ment of legal norms that have been developed through decades or centuries
of experience. For example, as the development and proliferation of
"weapons of mass destruction" have increased the potential speed and de-
structiveness of interactions between nations or of individuals intent on
aggression, it is common to argue that we are in a "new era" in which the
old rules of international law no longer apply. Although there may, occa-
sionally, be merit to such arguments, we would argue that belief that we are
living in a new era is often itself the product of powerful emotions such as
anger and fear, and is typically overblown. In fact, one could argue (as we
do), that it is exactly when the magnitude of potential threats multiplies that
there is the greatest need for careful deliberation about strategy. Facing
adversaries who are capable of unleashing mass destruction is the wrong
time to implement the kinds of symbolic solutions that are the common
product of emote control.
One might think that as civilization advances, emote control of behav-
ior would weaken. We, as a society, have greater information available,
more advanced technology, and higher levels of education than any society
in the past. Shouldn't these forces gradually lead to a diminution of emote
control? Unfortunately, the answer is anything but obvious. New technolo-
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gies do enhance our ability to figure out what is best for us, both as indi-
viduals and as a society, but other developments actually accentuate the
influence of emote control. For example, due to advancements in technol-
ogy, the information we receive from the media is delivered in ever-more
vivid form. Whereas in the past, people received their news by word of
mouth or in writing, most people now receive their news and information
from multisensory media-predominantly television. Television pictures
project not only into the home, but in automobiles, at workplaces, and even
on the screens that have recently begun to sprout in elevators. Moreover,
competition between different media outlets seems to promote the delivery
of quick, easily digestible "sound bites" or "talking points" with little ac-
companying analysis. Big picture thinking, or even simply thinking out the
long-term consequences of different actions, seems increasingly to be a
thing of the past. The competition for scarce attention has led to similar
developments throughout society--e.g., instant messaging as a replacement
for more leisurely composed letters. Even Supreme Court arguments have
been truncated-from days or hours to half an hour.
Third, and finally, analyzing the role affect plays in decision making
leads to understanding the specific legal processes that will counteract the
effectual distortion of the deliberative process. It is unrealistic to think that
legal process can provide a viable solution, as Professor Dershowitz does in
proposing the issuance by courts of torture warrants prior to the executive's
use of torture. For such solutions assume that courts will engage in delib-
erative decision making, an assumption that has often proven faulty in
times of grave national crisis. Instead, legal processes must be designed to
overcome the particular passions that skew deliberation. For example,
where nationalist passions overcome reason, national legal process would
inevitably be affected. Therefore, a solution that relies on an international
legal process is more likely to reintroduce deliberative mechanisms into
decision making.
People have always been controlled by their emotions and always will
be. As the opening quote from Einstein suggests, people with an agenda
have always been able to manipulate the populace by pulling emotional
levers. Joseph Goebbels understood, perhaps better than any other twenti-
eth-century political figure, the powerful pull that emotional, rather than
intellectual, arguments had in swaying mass sentiment. He argued that:
[t]here was no point in seeking to convert the intellectuals. For intellec-
tuals would never be converted and would anyway always yield to the
stronger, and this will always be "the man in the street." Arguments must
therefore be crude, clear and forcible, and appeal to emotions and in-
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stincts, not the intellect. Truth was unimportant and entirely subordinate
to tactics and psychology.
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The use of affect to manipulate the man in the street is, of course, not
exclusive to fascists. It is a time-tested tactic that has been used by left and
right alike. Nor do we believe that an understanding of the role of affect in
foreign policy, terrorism and international law tends to support policies
advocated by people at one end of the political spectrum or the other, con-
trary to any such perception that our choice of examples may have pro-
duced. To allay such an impression, we have deliberately illustrated our
points with examples in which both Democratic and Republican admini-
strations have used emotional appeals to justify going to war. Indeed, emo-
tional appeals can be made by pacifists as well as hawks. Virtually all
policy discussions contain some mix of appeal to both the rational and the
emotional. The purpose of this Article is to point out some of the problem-
atic characteristics of emote control and to suggest some mechanisms that
could bolster the influence of deliberation.
While the importance of emote control in individual psychology has
remained relatively unchanged over time, the science of psychology is
constantly improving, including an ever-better understanding of how peo-
ple can be manipulated by triggering their emotions. Law should gain in-
sight from the advances in the science of psychology and counteract these
trends. Law must keep deliberative control in the picture, especially at
times of high affect when it is needed the most.
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